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Have the FCA provided regulations which effectively protect the financially vulnerable 
from harmful practices?   
Introduction 
Following on from the global financial crisis in the United Kingdom (UK), regulation and 
supervision of financial businesses has been reformed significantly.1 As a direct result of the 
financial crisis, the payday loan market grew at a rapid pace, with millions of families 
struggling to deal with stretched incomes and firmer restrictions on mainstream credit.2 This 
resulted in many turning to high-cost short-term credit, to survive such changes, payday 
loans being the primary alternative to mainstream credit.3  
Payday lending in the UK however, has attracted vast amounts of negative political and 
media attention from the issues that have arisen in the consumer credit industry.4 Concerns 
were raised by consumer groups, debt-advice charities and other interested parties 
regarding the operation of the payday lending sector.5 Poor and irresponsible lending 
practices, product features and the high cost of the repayment of such loans led to a vast 
amount of people falling into severe financial difficulties.6 High-cost short-term credit firms, 
                                                          
1 Andrea Fejos, ‘Achieving Safety and Affordability in the UK Payday Loans Market’ (2015) 181 
>https://moodle.essex.ac.uk/pluginfile.php/706335/mod_resource/content/1/Fejos%2C%20Payday%20loans
%2C%20official%20copy.pdf <accessed 21 May 2019 
2 ibid 
3 Laura Rodrigues, ‘Payday loans: The next generation: Changes to the high-cost short-term credit market since 
the introduction of the price cap’ (StepChange Debt Charity Report, 2016) 2 > 
https://www.stepchange.org/Portals/0/documents/Reports/Payday-loans-next-generation.pdf <accessed 21 
May 2019 
4 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Payday lending market investigation: final report’ (2015) 28 
>https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/54ebb03bed915d0cf7000014/Payday_investigation_Final_re
port.pdf <accessed 22 May 2019 
5 ibid 
6 Rodrigues (n3) 2 
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credit lenders particularly in the payday lending industry, have caused numerous problems 
for consumers.7 Unregulated and unscrupulous practices carried out by these credit lenders 
have caused an alarming level of debt for their consumers and generated a widespread level 
of harm and misery.8 These unscrupulous practices include a variety of issues, such as the 
firms not properly assessing a customers affordability to meet the repayments due on a 
loan, not being thorough in their checks and asking potential borrowers for very little of 
information and no proof.9 Further issues include inappropriate and misleading 
advertisements, and whether forbearance is shown when customers get into difficult 
meeting repayments.10 
Research has shown that approximately one in six people with consumer credit debt suffer 
moderate to severe ‘financial distress’, which has led to them experiencing financial 
difficulties or other issues such as mental health problems, caused by the strain of repaying 
their debts.11 Widespread concerns regarding the credit products being sold and practices of 
payday lenders lead to the introduction of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and stricter 
rules on payday lending.12 The government acknowledged that intervention was prominent 
and was needed to address such problems, thus, when the FCA gained the ability to regulate 
and supervise consumer credit, it prioritised and focused on payday loans.13 In 2013, the 
FCA proposed a regime which aimed at providing stronger protection consumers in the UK, 
                                                          
7 Citizens Advice, ‘Payday Loans after the cap: are consumers getting a better deal?’ (2016) 9 > 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/Debt%20and%20Money%20Publications/Payday%2
0Loan%20Report%202.pdf <accessed 22 May 2019 
8 ibid 
9 ibid 
10 Competition and Markets Authority (n 4) 28 
11 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Preventing financial distress by predicting unaffordable consumer credit 
agreements: An applied framework’ (Occasional Paper 28, 2017) 3 > 21 May 2019 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/op17-28.pdf <accessed  
12 Rodrigues (n 3) 2 
13 Fejos (n 1) 182 
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through tougher requirements for payday lenders including a mandatory affordability 
assessment.14 These new responsible lending rules have calmed the storm, the regulations 
and guidance given to credit lenders has prevented such financial companies from carrying 
out bad practices, and whilst the FCA has generally done well in providing rules and 
guidance, there is good reason to believe that the actions of the FCA have gone some way to 
tackling the worst excesses of the payday loan market.15 Although one would argue that this 
is welcomed progress, there is still a long way to go before these rules fully protect 
consumers.  
The primary aim of this research is to identify any flaws in the current FCA responsible 
lending rules, and secondly to find alternatives for the financially vulnerable to access credit, 
deciphering whether strengthening consumer protection or providing for better alternatives 
is the way forward for effective consumer protection. This essay will proceed to 
demonstrate how the UK’s responsible lending rules have provided stronger protection than 
before for consumers, however strengthened consumer protection has limited access to 
credit. Providing stronger consumer protectionist measures is likely to exclude the 
financially vulnerable sector of society, yet the current measures in place provide too much 
scope for credit lenders, which allows them to abuse the measures the FCA have put in 
place, and subsequently lead to the financially vulnerable not getting the level of protection 
they deserve. 
 
                                                          
14 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘The FCA sets out in detail how it will regulate consumer credit, including 
payday lending, when it takes over responsibility in April 2014’ (Press Release, 2013) 
>https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-sets-out-detail-how-it-will-regulate-consumer-credit-
including-payday <accessed 21 August 2019 
15 Rodrigues (n 3) 5 
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High-Cost Short-Term Credit and the Payday Loan Industry 
In order to discuss high-cost short-term credit and the payday loan industry, the first points 
to establish are what is high-cost short-term credit? And specifically, what are payday loans? 
Research shows that the UK is home to the second largest payday lending market in the 
world, closely followed by the United States with approximately 10% of the UK adult 
population having applied for a payday loan, this being approximately 4.6 million adults.16 
Whilst the UK’s consumer credit market one of the biggest in Europe, it experiences rapid 
changes on a recurrent basis.17 The market includes an array of products, ranging from 
mainstream credit, such as personal loans and credit cards, to high-cost short-term credit 
such as the payday lenders who offer short-term loans to consumers, subject to an interest 
rate.18  
This type of credit is regularly used by consumers, however, different types of people use 
this credit for very different reasons to give an example, many may use credit to manage 
finances whilst others may use it to buy luxury items, such as taking out a personal loan to 
purchase a car.19 One consumer may participate in this market very differently to the next. 
However, many consumers participate in this market due to mainstream credit being 
inaccessible, whether it be due to a poor credit history or a low income.20 Therefore, these 
consumers are different to those who use the credit for luxury items, they participate in this 
                                                          
16 John Gathergood, Benedict Guttman-Kenney, Stefan Hunt, ‘How Do Payday Loans Affect Borrowers? 
Evidence from the UK Market’ (Oxford University Press, 2018) 497 >https://0-watermark-silverchair-
com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/hhy090.pdf <accessed 22 July 2019 
17 National Audit Office, ‘Office of Fair Trading: regulating consumer credit’ (2012) 9 
>https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1213685.pdf <accessed 03 July 2019 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
20 National Audit Office (n 17) 12 
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market to carry on with day to day necessities, to purchase items that are essential to them 
in everyday life.21 
The high-cost credit market is older than money itself, however, when discussing this 
market it is practicable to ask, what exactly does high-cost credit really mean?22 Precisely 
defining payday lending is difficult due to the complexity of the market, and the links it has 
to other forms of fringe finance.23 These links and relationships with other financial 
products, such as the ones given as examples above, have created an unexpected level of 
controversy in the UK.24 Whilst this is the case, the FCA decided upon its own terminology 
and definition for this specific type of credit product.25 High-cost credit refers to high 
interest, short-term loans from finance companies who aim to make a profit from the 
interest charged to the consumer on the loan.26 One of the more flagrant and costly traps 
that low income or vulnerable individuals are compelled to step into, is that of payday 
loans.27 Payday loans are a form of high-cost credit, usually for small amounts of money, 
which can be repaid over a short period of time.28 It was tradition that the repayment for 
the loan would be paid on the customers next payday, hence the term payday loan, 
                                                          
21 ibid 
22 Christopher L. Peterson, ‘Taming the Sharks: Towards a Cure for the High cost Credit Market’ ( 1st edn, 
University of Akron Press, 2004) 45 
23 Karen Rowlingson, Linsey Appleyard, Jodi Gardener, ‘Payday lending in the UK: the regul(aris)ation of a 
necessary evil?’ Cambridge University Press 45(3) (2016) 531 >https://0-www-cambridge-
org.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/FF33B00EC7A0087283BDE8092397A824/S0047279416000015a.pdf/payday_lending_in_th
e_uk_the_regularisation_of_a_necessary_evil.pdf <accessed 26 July 2019 
24 ibid 
25 Karen Fairweather, Paul O’Shea, Ross Grantham, ‘Credit, Consumers and the Law: After the global storm’ 
(Routledge, 2017) 133 
26 ibid 
27 Carol Realini, Karl Mehta, ‘Financial Inclusion at the Bottom of the Pyramid’ (1st edn, FriesenPress, 2015) 28 
28 Fejos (n 1) 182 
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however many are now repayable over longer periods of time, across several months for 
example,29 furthering away from the notion of ‘short-term’. 
Why is consumer protection important? 
Following on from the financial crisis of 2008, the payday lending market experienced a 
significant growth.30  The market has evolved into an environment where individuals find 
themselves in a situation of financial disarray where cash is needed instantly, for a short 
period of time, and where mainstream credit is inaccessible to them.31 Whilst the market 
has very gradually declined in recent years, the volume and amount lent today is still 
considerably high.32 Whilst many of the loans are for small amounts, an average being 
estimated at two hundred and sixty pounds, the issue arises from the inexistent financial 
ceiling on the size of the short-term loan.33 
It is apparent that today too many low-income families are turning to payday loans as a 
safety net to survive, relying on them to pay for everyday household items, or one-off 
expenses that are immediately unaffordable.34 It was estimated that 1.4 million people used 
high-cost credit in 2017 for everyday household costs, a rise above the 1.1 million calculated 
in 2016.35 This regular reliance on such credit put pressure on households who are already 
                                                          
29 ibid 
30 Anu Aurora, ‘Payday loans: filling the gaps in the short-term loan market’ (Company Lawyer, 2017) 
>https://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad629030000016bbc32f9905c3e33f9&docg
uid=I70DF77A03A1F11E7A9E1F8E5C12DC658&hitguid=I70DF77A03A1F11E7A9E1F8E5C12DC658&rank=10&sp
os=10&epos=10&td=60&crumb-action=append&context=6&resolvein=true <accessed 04 July 2019 
31 ibid 
32 Alexander Hill Smith, ‘Money, Money, Money’ 165 NLJ 7651 (2015) 15 > https://0-www-lexisnexis-
com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/uk/legal/results/enhdocview.do?docLinkInd=true&ersKey=23_T28888326158&format
=GNBFULL&startDocNo=0&resultsUrlKey=0_T28888326160&backKey=20_T28888326161&csi=280276&docNo
=5&scrollToPosition=343 <accessed 14 July 2019 
33 ibid 
34 Rodrigues (n 3) 2 
35 ibid 
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on very tight budgets and leaves them particularly vulnerable to falling into problem debt.36 
It is clear to see that payday loans are still very common today, and their popularity leaves 
one to question whether the regulations put in place by the FCA suffice to meet consumer 
protection standards and prevent issues such as spiralling debts for consumers who cannot 
afford to repay these loans. As consumer protection is vital to this research, the question 
that arises is why is consumer protection so important? Why should consumers be 
protected?  
The economic recovery, following the recession in the UK, has started to show signs of 
improvement, with economic growth gradually increasing.37 However, the benefits of such 
recovery are being disproportionately felt by the UK population, with the most advantaged 
feeling the majority of its benefits.38 Research demonstrates that millions of people and 
families in the UK are still struggling with their everyday financial affairs, food, water and 
electric bills to give examples.39 Fifteen million people falling behind on their bills, including 
six million who use credit to keep going until payday, alongside three million people who 
use credit to maintain their already existing credit commitments.40 In 2013 it was reported 
that nine of the UK’s biggest payday lenders saw their turnover double in the previous three 
years, with one firm recording a thirty-two fold increase in profits since the beginning of the 
recession in the UK.41 A big player in the payday lending market, Wonga, reported record 
profits, a 36% increase on the previous year.42 Whilst Wonga claimed its profits were not 
                                                          
36 ibid 
37 Fairweather, O’Shea, Grantham (n 25) 134 
38 ibid 
39 ibid 
40 ibid 
41 Meghna Mukerjee, ‘It’s Been a Good Year for Wonga: That’s Never a Good Sign’ (NewStatesman, 2013) > 
https://www.newstatesman.com/business/2013/09/its-been-good-year-wonga-thats-never-good-sign 
<accessed 10 August 2019 
42 ibid 
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from preying on people living on the breadline, being desperate, the firm was heavily 
criticised for generating profit from low income consumers forcing them into misery and 
pushing the needy deeper into debt.43 Historically, it was not in a lenders best interest to 
engage in unscrupulous lending practices. However, firms used sophisticated television 
advertisements, for a consumer it would have been hard to avoid the lure of the ‘quick and 
easy’ payday loan.44 Further, a number of changes to the consumer credit market caused 
lending standards to fall, which has subsequently led to the rapid rise of irresponsible 
lending.45 This rise in irresponsible lending is the primary reason consumer protection has 
been highlighted and emphasis has been placed on its importance.46 Nearly 93% of people 
believed that regulation was needed, topping public concern was the advertising of payday 
loans, and the need to give a clearer indication about the total cost of the debt, overall 
consumers needed to be educated about payday loans and regulations needed to prevent 
such harmful practices.47 
The central focus of contemporary consumer economies is credit, and it is therefore 
unsurprising that governments should demonstrate a great level of concern when 
promoting and regulating its use.48 However, there are very specific reasons as to why 
consumer protection is such an important aspect of regulating credit. It is apparent that 
many consumers use high cost short term credit as part of their everyday lives without 
                                                          
43 ibid 
44 R3, ‘The Association of Business Recovery Professionals, ‘Rein in “Payday Lenders,” Say 93 Percent of GB 
Population’ (press release, 2012) > www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1114&element=16322 >accessed 10 
August 2019 
45 Jessica Tuffin, ‘Responsible Lending Laws: Essential Development or Overreaction’ Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 9(2) (2009) 281 >https://0-heinonline-
org.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/qutlj9&i=287 <accessed 26 July 2019 
46 ibid 
47 R3 (n 44) 
48 Iain Ramsay, ‘Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets’ (3rd edn, Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 361 
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running into serious difficulties, however this is not always the case, many consumers fall 
into harmful debt traps.49 Whilst payday loans offer a quick fix for consumers to get money 
instantly, and although there are benefits to an increased availability of credit, which will be 
discussed further in the next section, this availability has been overshadowed by a ‘dark 
side’ to consumer credit.50 This so called ‘dark side’ is shown through increased record levels 
of consumer debt and evidence of continuous irresponsible lending practices.51 
Longstanding claims have been made by consumer and welfare organisations in the UK, that 
payday lending has detrimental effects on financially vulnerable consumers, those 
consumers who are a primary target for the payday lenders.52 The debt support trust found 
that whilst assisting people with their financial woes, most people found themselves to be 
struggling in other areas of their life as a direct result of debt, be it marital issues, mental 
health issues or problems at work.53 Research has found that a relationship exists between 
debt and maternal depression among lone parents, further debt has formed a relationship 
with stress, anxiety and depression.54 Consumer protection has gradually developed over 
the past few decades and from this general field emanated specific principles, one of which 
was financial consumer protection.55 The global financial crisis of 2008 emphasised the 
                                                          
49 National Audit Office (n 17) 5 
50 Abdul Karim Aldohni, ‘Law and Finance after the Financial Crisis: The Untold Stories of the UK financial 
Market’ (Routledge, 2017) 50 
51 ibid 
52 Paul Ali, Cosima McRae, Ian Ramsay, ‘Payday lending regulation and borrower vulnerability in the UK and 
Australia’ JBL (2015) 
>https://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad629030000016bb9d63abb49d207bf&doc
guid=IE127E150D99111E4A980CA5F572AE19A&hitguid=IE127E150D99111E4A980CA5F572AE19A&rank=27&s
pos=27&epos=27&td=1928&crumb-action=append&context=17&resolvein=true <accessed 03 July 2019 
53 Stuart Carmichael, ‘Borrower Beware’, Pay and Benefits (9)(2015) >https://0-www-lexisnexis-
com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/uk/legal/results/enhdocview.do?docLinkInd=true&ersKey=23_T28888075895&format
=GNBFULL&startDocNo=0&resultsUrlKey=0_T28888082654&backKey=20_T28888082655&csi=280242&docNo
=3&scrollToPosition=332 <accessed 14 July 2019 
54 Ramsay (n 48) 468 
55 P. O’Shea, K. Fairweather, R. Grantham, ‘Credit, Consumers and the Law: After the Global Storm’ Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation (2017) 
>https://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad8289e0000016b8dbc2c565d6eeec1&doc
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importance of the doctrine of financial consumer protection, highlighting why this field 
needed to be regulated, looking at consumer credit in particular.56 
The financially vulnerable sector of society- who are they and why should they be 
protected? 
It has already been established that many consumers participate in the payday lending 
industry due to mainstream credit being unavailable, whether it be due to a poor credit 
history or low income. These consumers are different to those who use payday loans for 
luxury items. Whilst both types of consumer should be protected, extra protection is 
needed for the latter who use them due to the lack of access to mainstream credit. The 
main question which is pivotal to the discussion this research will portray is who are the 
financially vulnerable and why should they be subject to strict regulations that protection 
them as a credit consumer? 
 As the term financially vulnerable will be used a lot throughout this research, it is important 
to decipher what is meant by this term. Whilst the Oxford Dictionary provides that the 
adjective ‘vulnerable’ means to something or somebody weak and easily hurt physically and 
emotionally, its definition is far from this simple.57 The FCA identified that the term 
vulnerability is so subjective it makes the term hard to define,58 however, the majority of 
consumers who use consumer credit may be vulnerable to a certain degree due to their 
financial circumstances.59 The FCA considered a vulnerable consumer to be someone who, 
                                                          
guid=I74E3B1407C4B11E7A2C08479636B414E&hitguid=I74E3B1407C4B11E7A2C08479636B414E&rank=12&s
pos=12&epos=12&td=57&crumb-action=append&context=6&resolvein=true <accessed 25 June 2019 
56 ibid 
57 ‘vulnerable’ Oxford Dictionary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
58 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Consumer credit and consumers in vulnerable circumstances’ (2014) 5 > 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/consumer-credit-customers-vulnerable-circumstances.pdf 
<accessed 09 August 2019 
59 ibid 
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due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to detriment.60 Whilst this 
definition is provided, the category is very broad, and to effectively protect consumers, one 
would suggest that the specific categories of people who fall within this definition need to 
be identified. When classifying the financially vulnerable, a large variety of factors must be 
taken into consideration which makes defining this category very difficult. It is apparent that 
addressing the issue of financial exclusion is a key UK European objective, with the Treaty of 
Lisbon embodying the reduction of social exclusion.61 However, in terms of credit, one 
would say that a financially vulnerable consumer can fall in to many sub categories and 
whilst one consumer may constantly be classed as financially vulnerable, another may fall 
into this category for a temporary period of time. In the context of finance, vulnerability is 
important and whilst being on a low income is not a sole or necessary condition of 
vulnerability, it is a cause of financial vulnerability, and combined with others such as young 
age or simply lacking a level of literacy, can cause this consumer significant harm.62 The 
House of Commons Treasury Committee broadly welcomed the FCA’s work to define 
vulnerability and identified that the FCA’s broad definition of vulnerability enables it to 
incorporate those who may experience these circumstances occasionally and be classified as 
vulnerable for a temporary period of time, as well as those individuals who may be 
permanently vulnerable.63 
                                                          
60 ibid 
61 Ramsay (n 48) 498 
62 Abdul Karim Aldohni, ‘The UK New Regulatory Framework of High Cost Short Term Credit: Is There a Shift 
Towards a More “Law and Society” Based Approach?’ (J Consum Policy, 2017) 325 > 
http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?EbscoContent=dGJyMMTo50Seprc4v%2BvlOLCmr1Gep7RSs
am4SLCWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGvtkmyqLdNuePfgeyx9Yvf5ucA&T=P&P=AN&S=R&D=bsu&K=1249
71272 <accessed 09 August 2019 
63 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Consumer’s access to financial services’ (29th report of session, 
2019) 51 > https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/1642/1642.pdf <accessed 12 
August 2019 
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To build upon the FCA’s definition, the individual categories will be explored, which will 
allow one to determine whether they are covered by the consumer protectionist measures 
the FCA have put in place. Firstly, it is apparent that those who have experienced or 
currently possess a poor credit history can be subject to this category, financially vulnerable 
consumers may be classified at those who experience financial difficulty, are currently in 
debt or who experience financial problems on a daily basis.64 In the past, evidence has 
suggested that many consumers who had decided to turn to payday lending had 
experienced financial problems, with many of these having had an unauthorised overdraft 
and many more having experienced a debt problem in the years prior to applying for a 
payday loan.65 Further, research has found that consumer credit firms prioritised the 
repayment of a loan over the consumers circumstances, which generated widespread 
evidence of poor customer outcomes.66 Many consumers had poor credit histories and 
restricted access to other forms of credit which meant that some consumers are likely to 
have been less price sensitive.67 It is practicable to say that providing credit to consumers 
who have struggled with finance in the past is simply opening the door to a debt trap that 
the consumer is unaware of, further if the consumer does not have access to mainstream 
credit, should they be allowed to enter into these high interest loans?  
                                                          
64 ibid 
65 Aurora (n 30) 
66 Caroline Binham, ‘Widespread evidence of poor outcomes at consumer-credit firms’ Financial Conduct 
Authority (2016) 
>https://moodle.essex.ac.uk/pluginfile.php/615878/mod_resource/content/1/Binham%2C%20%E2%80%98Wi
despread%20evidence%E2%80%99%20of%20poor%20outcomes%20at%20consumer-
credit%20firms%20%E2%80%93%20FCA.pdf <accessed 23 May 2019 
67 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Payday Lending, Final Decision on Making a Market Investigation Reference’ (2013) 7 
>https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/532ad579e5274a226b000307/payday-MIR.pdf <accessed 23 
May 2019 
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There is a further acknowledgement that providing effective consumer protection should 
involve paternalistic elements, a paternalistic approach constrains the freedom of contract 
and autonomy of the customer.68 Although this paternalistic element has been 
acknowledged, the problematic question is to what extent this type of intervention should 
be implemented.69 This degree of intervention interesting and when analysing the 
regulations will be discussed further, to explore ways to improve the current rules in place. 
A factor which can contribute to vulnerability, is the age of the consumer.70 A common issue 
that arose with regard to payday loans were the target audience of advertisements, these 
being vulnerable adults and children, of whom were being persuaded through quick and 
easy application processes.71 The demand for high-cost short-term credit among young 
adults is worryingly high, further, a worrying number of undergraduate students have 
turned to high-cost short-term lenders, to cope with university expenses.72 A great number 
of consumers had very low levels of financial understanding which led to them suffering 
from harm, specifically where lenders took advantage of their firms not being monitored 
and addressed properly.73 At the height of the payday loan industry, lenders lent out money 
indiscriminately and where consumers could not repay, a short-term loan was offered to 
pay off one loan, resulting in one loan after another and then another.74 Subsequently these 
vulnerable consumers were left drowning.75  
                                                          
68 O’Shea, Fairweather, Grantham (n 55) 
69 ibid 
70 Fejos (n 1) 182  
71 ibid 
72 Aldohni (n 62) 324  
73 National Audit Office (n 17) 
74 James Moore, ‘Payday lending isn’t over yet- and now its victims are being shortchanged yet again’ (The 
Independent, 2019) >https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/wonga-loans-payday-lending-compensation-
scheme-victims-wageday-a8852651.html <accessed 22 July 2019 
75 ibid 
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Mental health can be another factor which can contribute to a consumer being classified as 
financially vulnerable. Those consumers who suffer with mental health issues are at risk of 
debt, the charity 12 of Christians Against Poverty’s debt advice found that mental health 
conditions were the primary driver for debt for one in every twelve of its clients.76 People 
living with mental health conditions are susceptible to becoming victims of financial 
exclusion as they are more likely to be out of work or living an unstable lifestyle beyond 
their control.77 Whilst a two-way relationship exists between mental health and financial 
exclusion, the experience of dealing with such a situation can have further negative effects 
such as stress, anxiety and depression, all of which can be attributed to their financial 
situation.78 
Employment has also played a part in determining people who can fall within the financially 
vulnerable category. Payday loans have allowed consumers to mitigate financial distress in 
extraordinary or temporary circumstances and increase individual and community resilience 
to such financial downturns. 79 However, over the years, employment patterns have been 
subject to structural changes, this is due to a growth of both self and part-time employment, 
zero-hour contracts and cuts in state benefits, which have all brought about unpredictable 
incomes and led to the generation of financial instability.80 The number of people who are 
self-employed has risen by 45% percent over the past years and more than nine-hundred 
thousand people are on zero-hour contracts, these have been referred to as the ‘gig 
                                                          
76 Financial Conduct Authority (n 58) 10  
77 House of Lords, Select Committee on Financial Exclusion, ‘Tackling Financial Exclusion: A country that works 
for everyone?’ (Report of Session 2016-17) 51> 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldfinexcl/132/132.pdf <accessed 12 August 2019 
78 ibid 
79 Fejos (n 1) 188  
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economy’.81 Under both types of employment, there is no guaranteed or stable form of 
income.82 A dip in income could lead to a serious and harmful result for the consumer, with 
many being unable to manage such a risk. These unpredictable circumstances mean that, in 
absence of savings, people may have to turn to credit to bridge the gap from a shortfall in 
income.83 
Whilst consumers may always be classed as financially vulnerable, many consumers may 
experience vulnerability for just a short period of time, the most marginal debtors are 
payday loan consumers, whatever their household income may be.84 Payday loan customers 
have a tendency to generate below average incomes, however, are not classified as poor.85 
The customers finances can be precarious, and in many cases are, however a payday lender 
offers to agree a cash advance to the consumer in exchange for up to the highest legal limit 
that can be charged as an interest rate.86  
It is clear to see that many of the consumer protection issues involve people of a vulnerable 
nature, for example, people who are young and mentally ill, as well as those who have poor 
credit histories or who have experienced financial distress in the past. Whilst the FCA has 
recognised that limiting access to credit does not benefit the consumer in situations of 
temporary financial emergencies of a non-recurrent nature, it is clear that adversity has 
arisen due to a large number of agreements being entered into in the past.87 Loans have 
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particularly been made to consumers who have been unable to repay them on their given 
due date, which has resulted in the loan rolling over, increasing the cost of the repayment of 
the loan by a great amount. More often than not the loan would be rolled over more than 
once, this increase in the price of the loan, drastically increases the level of indebtedness 
which soon reaches an alarming level. 88 
Financial vulnerability comes in all shapes and sizes, and whilst many consumers may 
experience this financial vulnerability on a permanent basis, many experiences this for a 
short or temporary period of time as discussed. The problems that arise with this category 
being so broad is how to generate a set of criteria which would include all of these 
consumers under one roof. How can consumers be fully protected when this category of 
people does change on a regular basis? Should stronger protection be implemented for 
these consumers who are financially vulnerable, or does this simply limit access to credit for 
consumers as a whole?  
Why is it important for consumers be able to access credit efficiently, and why access to 
credit should not be restricted? 
Whilst great emphasis has been placed on the importance of protecting the consumer, it is 
just as important to discuss how access to credit must be balanced with this protection and 
how a complete ban on payday loans would not be the answer to solving the problems 
discussed above. It is apparent that consumer credit plays a vital role in everyday life for 
many consumers, it does so by providing flexibility in managing finances and allows goods 
and services to be available immediately, without the consumer having to wait and save to 
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get them at a later date.89 Contrary to many of the negative portrayal of the payday lending 
industry as being extortionate and unscrupulous, particularly by the media and 
campaigners, consumer credit borrowers have emphasised the positive aspects of being 
able to access payday loans, namely their ease of access and the ability to maintain dignity 
and privacy, as well as obtaining a level of responsibility and independence.90  
Allowing consumers to access money immediately, or within a few hours, without the need 
to provide security, can provide a vital solution for consumers.91 Therefore, the rise of the 
payday lending market filled a gap in the market and offered a solution to the demand for 
high cost short term credit. 92 A series of fundamental, yet interrelated, long term changes 
have occurred in the labour market in the UK which have led to a favourable climate for the 
increase in the number of payday loans granted.93 However, it is important to see why 
access to credit is necessary and financial exclusion is not the best option when aiming to 
protect consumers. The term financial exclusion can be broad and henceforth can be used in 
various circumstances relating to lack of access to a range of financial services or a narrow 
concept reflecting different circumstances, for example exclusion due to charges and prices 
being prohibitively high.94 Self-exclusion is also important, as this will permit a consumer 
from applying for such credit because they believe they will be refused, because of previous 
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refusal or the belief that they do not accept people of the calibre they believe themselves to 
be.95  
Economic development is key, and financial inclusion plays a vital part to this development. 
Research has demonstrated that financial inclusion matters for economic development and 
poverty reduction,96 and this inclusion has said to reflect a growing realisation of its 
potentially transformative power to accelerate transformation gains.97 Financial inclusion 
seeks to include the vulnerable sector of society in the formal banking system, to develop 
their financial wellbeing and to stimulate economic growth.98 The primary goal of financial 
inclusion is concerned with members of society who have previously been excluded from 
formal banking, specifically concentrating on the extent and depth of a country’s vulnerable 
sector engaging with its mainstream banking system.99 
Whilst financial inclusion is important, a common argument for providing access to credit is 
that if rules and regulations make financial credit difficult to access, less people will be able 
to access the credit that they may need at a specific point in time.100 This will disallow 
consumers from accessing products and services, potentially in exceptional circumstances 
when credit is needed immediately.101 Further those who work in the consumer credit 
industry are likely to argue that limiting access to credit will force people in the direction of 
illegal loan sharks and generate greater issues for those who are unable to repay payday 
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lenders.102 If credit cannot be accessed in a safe and legal manner, consumers will seek for 
credit elsewhere, creating bigger problems for themselves, for example in Glasgow in the 
early 1980s illegal moneylending was found to be the most effective alternative where 
access to credit was not available.103  
It is clear to see that access to financial services and financial inclusion are key issues which 
are fundamentally important to the functioning of the economy in the UK. Whilst the 
financially vulnerable sector has been focussed on here, it is important to note that financial 
inclusion matters to everybody, not just the disadvantaged or vulnerable.104 Whilst 
intervention in the payday lending market to prevent borrowers from accessing credit 
inevitably undermines the rights of the borrowers, specifically their right to freely enter into 
contracts of their choice, it is still vital for consumer protection to be balanced with 
providing access to credit for consumers.105 
The FCA’s Responsible Lending Rules 
The Creditworthiness Assessment and Affordability Assessment- Two Separate Tests 
The primary focus throughout this research is being placed upon the responsible lending 
rules, introduced by the FCA, in response to severe criticism from consumers, debt charities 
and the governments recognition of such criticism. The introduction of these consumer 
protectionist measures aims to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness and affordability, to 
ensure that the loan they wish to take out is practicable and affordable for both the 
consumer and the credit lender, whilst acting in a customer’s best interests, and ensuring 
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the transparency of terms and conditions.106 The FCA handbook provides two separate 
assessments of which firms must take into consideration before granting a loan to a 
consumer, thus being the risk of the credit and affordability of the loan.107 The firm must 
undertake a creditworthiness assessment and have proper regard to the outcome of that 
assessment in respect of affordability risk.108 These two tests are very different and should 
be assessed separately, as they both obtain important elements of consumer protection.109 
The credit risk primarily focuses on the risk to the lender that the consumer will not be able 
to meet the repayments, whilst the affordability risk focuses on how difficult the 
repayments may be for the consumer to repay the credit.110 Differentiating between the 
two allows the credit risk to be a ‘lender-focused’ test, whilst the affordability risk acts as a 
‘borrower-focused’ test.111 A discussion of both assessments separately will portray the 
important role each play in protecting the consumer, and why they have been introduced as 
separate tests will demonstrate the FCA’s push towards a stronger, more efficient 
protection of consumers from these harmful credit lenders. The regulation and guidance will 
be analysed to portray any flaws they possess, and further, it will seek to determine 
whether these regulations and guidance are strong enough to protect the financially 
vulnerable. Further, it will determine whether stronger protection is needed, or the 
government needs to support or implement better alternatives. 
Creditworthiness Assessment 
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The first of the responsible lending rules to be analysed will be the creditworthiness 
assessment, as this was one of the first rules to be implemented by the FCA. Its introduction 
as a responsible lending rule formed a starting point for rules and guidance to be put in 
place to contribute towards protecting consumers from harmful practices, for example the 
FCA provides that a credit lender must undertake a reasonable assessment of the 
creditworthiness of a customer before entering into a regulated credit agreement, or 
significantly increasing the amount of credit provided.112 A firm must base its 
creditworthiness assessment on sufficient information: of which it is aware at the time the 
creditworthiness assessment is carried out; obtained where appropriate, from the 
customer, and where necessary from a credit reference agency and the information must 
enable the firm to carry out a reasonable creditworthiness assessment.113 Whilst this is a 
starting point for the FCA, discrepancies and flaws in this rule are immediately apparent. 
One would argue that the first issue that arises with this rather small section of the 
regulation is that there is an underlying uncertainty as to what firms should regard as a 
‘significant increase’. The FCA made it clear that it did not want to be overly prescriptive as 
to when an increase should be deemed significant.114 However, they also made it clear that 
they did wish to clarify that multiple separate increases, which may be seen as 
insignificantly individually, could result in a significant increase, resulting in the need for a 
further creditworthiness assessment.115 
It is clear to see that the problem here is that what may be deemed to be a significant 
increase to one firm, may not be deemed the same by another. One would argue that the 
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FCA emphasised that separate increases may be regarded as a significant increase, to 
provide flexibility for credit lenders and stay away from restrictive measures which could 
potentially jeopardise access to credit. Whilst this does provide a level of scope and 
flexibility for firms to develop their own tests, it also provides scope for firms to increase a 
consumer’s credit limit by a significant amount and simply say that it was regarded as 
insignificant. This argument stems from the issues that consumer credit firms have raised, 
namely the issue they have with the uncertainty that it causes, with many having sought 
further clarification on this term.116 A number of firms believe that guidance on what would 
constitute a significant increase would be of great use to them, with some consumer groups 
arguing that assessments should be required for any credit limit increase.117 One would 
argue that whilst requiring a creditworthiness assessment for every credit limit increase 
would be burdensome to credit lenders, increasing their workload, potentially decreasing 
profits, to fully protect consumers, this level of protection is needed, particularly for the 
financially vulnerable.  
Referring back to the paternalistic elements discussed earlier, one would say that a level of 
paternalism is needed here. If individuals are struggling financially, many would go to far 
lengths to get the credit they need, particularly as the upsurge in the use of high-cost credit 
was to ‘make ends meet’.118 With the history being particularly bad in this area, credit 
should not be increased unless another creditworthiness assessment is carried out. This 
avoids any potential prediction of missed payments and ensures that a credit lender does 
not allow someone, who is finically vulnerable, to enter into a spiralling debt that the lender 
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can potentially foresee. The initial basis for these regulations is to protect consumers from 
unscrupulous practices such as increases credit limits without checking the consumers 
creditworthiness, henceforth why should there be scope for credit lenders to abuse such 
regulations. Merely providing that a creditworthiness assessment is required only for 
significant increases, does not address the fact that consumers have taken out credit based 
on their creditworthiness at the time of the initial assessment, why should their credit limit 
be increased when their initial creditworthiness assessment had already set the bar of their 
credit limit? Increasing the credit limit without a creditworthiness assessment is merely an 
attractive feature for credit lenders to use to gain custom and allow consumers to fall into 
spiralling debt traps. It is imperative that one thinks back to why these regulations were 
implemented in the first place. It is apparent here that the FCA has tried to balance 
consumer protection with access to credit, however the access to credit element has tipped 
the scales, leaving consumers to be subject to the terms of the credit lender and open to 
harm. Further, evidence shows that credit lenders are confused as to what should be 
deemed as significant, their call for further guidance merely demonstrates that lenders are 
unsure, if lenders are unsure, how can the FCA be sure that consumers are getting the level 
of protection that they deserve? 
A further requirement in the creditworthiness assessment, is that to aid in assessing the 
financial standing of consumers and allow them to gain access to a range of financial 
services is the credit information of the consumer, which can be provided by a CRA.119 A CRA 
collects and records either public information or credit account information on a person’s 
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creditworthiness, which can then be given to lenders and credit providers.120 However, it is 
important to note that the CRA’s do not determine whether the loan should be granted or 
not, therefore one lender may decide to grant the loan, when another may not.121 The 
information provided by CRA’s is important and helps to move towards financial lenders 
acting and lending in a responsible manner.122  
However, it can be argued that using CRA’s can be problematic from a consumer protection 
perspective. Although the CRA’s do not make the decision for the credit lender, it is 
interesting to explore how efficient these agencies are, and whether the information they 
provide should be used by credit lenders to make the decision on whether or not to lend to 
a consumer. Concerns have been raised about the coverage and quality of credit 
information provided, the effectiveness of competition between CRA, and the extent of 
consumer engagement.123 A crucial aspect is that not all credit lenders report data to more 
than one CRA, therefore the reliance on the information provided by CRA’s has contributed 
to the downfall of the implementation of the FCA consumer credit rules as well as consumer 
protection.124  
Further and rather a major criticism of the FCA is that at this time they will not consult on 
real time data sharing requirements.125 Lenders providing data to CRA’s on a regular basis, 
typically a minimum of once a month, is one of the reciprocal principles that underpin data 
sharing.126 However, even when the data is provided this regularly, it can be as old as sixty 
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days before it is made available to other lenders.127 This can have a negative effect on 
competition creating serious consequences, however, is it particularly problematic for 
consumer welfare.128 Credit lenders not being able to access the most recent sixty days of 
the consumers credit history can result in loans being given to consumers who cannot afford 
to repay, subsequently resulting in unaffordable levels of debt for the consumer. This 
problematic not only for consumer protection as a whole, it also would benefit the 
financially vulnerable consumer. It would allow firms to better identify a consumers 
financial position, for example having a clearer picture of a consumers credit history, 
whether it be their lack of one due to age, one particular vulnerability, or recent missed 
payments which could be the very start of a poor credit history, again a vulnerable criterion 
which has been identified as a factor of financial vulnerability. Further, the question as to 
which lenders share information is an entirely commercial decision, and it is left up to the 
credit lenders to assess whether it is in their interests to grant the loan, they do not have to 
take into account any other information, such as the wider benefits to consumers.129  
A survey carried out by the FCA found that 96% of the firms who took part in their survey 
used CRA’s.130 For such a large number of firms to be turning to these agencies, surely the 
FCA should consider addressing the discrepancies they cause, and the potential these 
discrepancies have to jeopardise protection for, particularly for the financially vulnerable 
consumers. Data sharing could be an improvement for consumer protection and a possible 
recommendation for the FCA to research further. The absence of real-time data sharing is 
important for two key reasons, firstly because It is said to attribute to the cause of 
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unaffordable personal debt, arguably consumers are granted loans which are not truly 
affordable to them due to the fact that providers lack up to date records regarding their 
most recent liabilities and missed payments.131 Secondly, it has been said to limit the 
effectiveness of competition in many overlapping markets, as it deters providers from 
entering the market and limits their ability to compete on a fair basis.132  
One would argue that the FCA would benefit from revising the proposed strategy and 
develop regulatory solutions that encourage real-time data sharing and allows the 
innovative use of new technology.133 If the CRA’s data is not up to date, then assessments 
carried out by lenders are unlikely to accurately reflect the credit risk, or risk of financial 
distress at the time lenders are assessing the applications.134 Having access to out of date 
credit information means that it is impossible for credit lenders to conduct an accurate 
assessment of the consumers credit history, generating several adverse effects including 
loans made to consumers who cannot afford to repay, worsening their already bad financial 
position. These debts further increase bad debt for the credit lenders who as a result raise 
their interest rates to cover such losses. These higher interest rates have a knock-on effect 
for the consumers as it makes the loan more difficult to pay, resulting in an escalating spiral 
of high interest rates and consumer debt traps.135 Further, going back to the issues caused 
by increasing the loan without another creditworthiness assessment, if the CRA’s data is 
months behind, the consumer may have taken out another loan during this period of time 
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and substantially the lender is increasing a loan without having any knowledge of such 
financial affairs. 
A further criteria included in the creditworthiness assessment regulation is that the credit 
lender must consider the risk that the customers will not make the repayments under the 
agreement by their due dates, and the risk to the customer of not being able to make 
repayments under the agreement in accordance with the affordability risk.136 The guidance 
provided alongside this responsible lending rule provides that in relation to this rule, there 
may be circumstances in which the risk that one repayment will be missed or will be late is 
relevant to the creditworthiness assessment.137  
Questions are immediately raised when reading this guidance, a question of particular 
importance is, whether this rule is strict enough? Whilst the firms must consider the risk of 
non-repayment, there ‘may’ be circumstances where the risk of missing one repayment 
could be relevant to the firm’s assessment. In a consultation paper composed by the FCA, it 
was stated that whilst they wanted to avoid being too prescriptive, due to the fact that this 
could have harmful unintended consequences, they still wanted firms to be proportionate in 
their approach, and take into consideration the costs and risks of the credit for the 
individual consumer, as well as the probability that they may suffer harm as a result of the 
credit.138 This is another clear example of the FCA attempting to balance consumer 
protection with access to credit. Flexibility can be seen throughout the regulations, for 
example in the first rule discussed there were problems with the terminology, which the 
FCA did not want to clarify further due to the level of flexibility they wanted to maintain. 
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However, one would argue that the issue here is that if a company offering credit can 
foresee that the customer will miss a payment the practicable response is that the 
consumer should not be given the credit. Further, if one missed repayment can be foreseen, 
how can a firm truly show that they only foresaw one repayment? How can the consumer 
catch up with this repayment? So many questions arising merely from this small section of 
guidance, which one would suggest that the FCA needs to think more clearly about.  
Whilst the FCA has introduced this section into the responsible lending rules, like many 
sections this is merely guidance and not a set rule. It is clear to see that by strictly keeping 
this as guidance for credit lenders and not enforcing it as a regulation, gives firms the ability 
to generate their own creditworthiness assessment and the flexibility provided to allow 
access to credit. However, the rule is flexible enough for firms to disregard whether 
consumers can make repayments, and even where repayments are foreseen to be missed, 
the loan can still be granted to the consumer. Research carried out by the FCA found that 
consumers appear to have a higher risk of a bad credit ‘event’, such as missing a loan 
payment, in the three to twelve months after taking out a payday loan than would have 
been expected, taking into account their credit history.139 The question here is, what does 
this mean for a financially vulnerable consumer? One would argue that it simply means that 
those who are subject to vulnerabilities can fall through the loopholes provided here. 
Someone who can be foreseen to miss a payment can still be granted a loan. Young people 
who are new to the credit industry, or people who lack the capacity to understand the credit 
industry, or simply people who are uneducated with regards to handling finances, these 
people could be easily led to believe that it is okay to miss a payment. If the credit lender 
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can foresee a missed payment, and the consumer can also foresee that they will miss a 
payment, but the loan is needed so badly the consumer disregards their affordability, it can 
lead to consumer believing that they can miss a repayment and everything will be okay. 
Further consumers who are vulnerable due to their employment, be in zero-hours contract 
or self-employed, a credit lender may foresee that consumer will miss a payment due to 
their employment status. However, if they can foresee one missed payment, who can say 
they will not miss any further payments. These fluctuating employment patterns could 
subject the consumer to a loan where only one missed payment is foreseen by the credit 
lender when in fact the work may simply not be there the next month, or the month after 
that, the consumer is then left with a high-interest loan they cannot afford to repay.   
Although this argument is easier to see from a consumer protection perspective, when 
trying to balance this with providing access to credit, further issues arise. To give an 
example, if this guidance was to be made a rule, a stricter approach would restrict firms 
from providing credit and disallow consumers who may fall into the scope from gaining 
access to credit, generating a knock on effect of which denying access to credit results in, as 
discussed earlier. It is clear to see that it is very hard to strike the perfect balance between 
consumer protection and providing access to credit, however to protect these financially 
vulnerable consumers from unscrupulous practices, and the harm that has been so evident 
in the past, these firmer measures need to be implemented.  One would question as to why 
this guidance has been introduced when there is so much scope for firms to completely 
disregard it? Surely this is not providing an adequate answer to the problems discussed 
earlier in relation to unscrupulous practices and the neglection of consumer protection.  
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Throughout the creditworthiness assessment, the FCA requires firms to maintain a level of 
proportionality, the FCA provides that the information provided must be appropriate and 
proportionate to obtain and assess.140 When assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness for 
the loan, the responsible lending rules require the credit lender to demonstrate a degree of 
proportionality when making its judgement on whether or not to grant a loan.141 The extent 
and scope of the creditworthiness assessment, and the steps that the firm must take to 
satisfy the requirement that the assessment is a reasonable one, based on sufficient 
information, are dependent upon, and proportionate to, the individual circumstances of 
each case.142 The term proportionality is used by the FCA numerous times throughout the 
creditworthiness assessment and again emphasises that the current rules imposed by the 
FCA gives credit lenders the flexibility to make reasonable assessments, based on the facts 
of the case at hand, demonstrating once again a strong focus on balancing access to credit 
with consumer protection.  
However, if challenged by the FCA, the credit lender must demonstrate the basis on which 
they made their decision, adhering the proportionality requirement, justifying this level of 
flexibility as they believe that being unduly prescriptive could result in firms unnecessarily 
limiting lending and excluding customers who could afford to repay.143 Further, it could slow 
down the credit lending process, meaning that it would take consumers longer to be 
granted credit which is said to likely to result in consumers switching firms, or even turning 
to other, less appropriate forms of credit, such as loans with lower instalments yet a higher 
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overall cost.144 The FCA have acknowledged that concerns have been raised by both credit 
lenders and consumers regarding the guidance and detail on what firms should consider 
whilst making a creditworthiness assessment, with the desire for better guidance on this. 
What should firms deem to be reasonable? What one may deem to be reasonable another 
may not, one would question whether there should be a threshold, or something more than 
simply saying it should be reasonable. Further, they have emphasised that their approach is 
designed to allow firms to create their own processes having regard to proportionality.145 
Here similar issues are raised to those discussed with regard to the guidance provided by 
the FCA, the scope that the guidance provides, likewise with proportionality, merely 
jeopardises the effectiveness of the consumer protection regulations. 
Affordability assessment  
The second half of the responsible lending assessment focuses on the consumers 
affordability. It has been clear to see that the absence of adequate affordability rules can 
result in consumers suffering from potentially avoidable financial distress.146 Therefore the 
FCA introduced an affordability assessment which provides that a credit lender must 
consider the customer’s ability to make repayments under the agreement, out of or using: 
the customers income, income from savings or assets jointly held by the customer with 
another person, without the customer having to borrow to meet the repayments, without 
failing to make any other payment the customers has a contractual or statutory obligation 
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to make and without the repayments having a significant adverse impact on the customers 
financial situation.147  
Ensuring that a customer can repay the loan without it having an adverse impact on the 
customers financial situation, one would argue is a great step towards ensuring the 
consumer is protected from taking out a burdensome loan that they will struggle to repay, 
creating a safety net for consumers. Although this regulation in place, the FCA has allowed 
scope for the credit lender by providing that this rule applies unless the firm can 
demonstrate that it is obvious in the circumstances of the particular case that the customer 
is able to make repayments in accordance with this rule.148 Prior to these regulations being 
enforced by the FCA credit lenders raised concerns that greater emphasis on affordability 
may deter consumers from applying for a loan because the affordability requirements could 
become disproportionate to the credit obligation they were considering.149 The credit 
lenders expressed dismay emphasising that such requirements would be inappropriate and 
risk significantly increasing costs and reducing the availability of credit.150 Consumer 
organisations were concerned about this level of discretion and felt that restrictions should 
be placed upon it, further, many argued that income and expenditure should be assessed in 
all circumstances.151  
One would say that it is apparent to see that the FCA has tried here to include a flexible 
approach to the affordability test by incorporating such rules, however it also demonstrates 
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a slightly relaxed approach to the regulation. It is practicable to argue that it is pointless for 
firms to carry out an affordability assessment when they are provided with the scope to 
simply say it was ‘obvious’ from the circumstances that the consumer could afford the loan. 
One would argue that this approach is very hard to enforce and fails to consider what 
criterions should be factored into this approach. If anything, one would argue that this is an 
easy way out for firms who fail to carry out adequate affordability assessments, further 
what may be obvious to one person, may be as unobvious to another. Whilst it is clear that 
this regulation would be determined on the merits of each case, who has the right to say 
that the circumstances of the case make it obvious that the consumer can repay the loan? 
Taking out a loan should be based on hard facts rather than a credit lenders opinion of a 
situation. Again, this raises red flags as far as the financially vulnerable are concerned, it 
leaves them wide open for credit lenders to take advantage of whatever vulnerability they 
may possess. The FCA have identified this issue and stated that whilst feedback from firms 
and their supervisory experience suggest there is still some uncertainty about regulatory 
expectations, in particular how far firms are expected to go with regard to assessing 
affordability and what procedures should underpin this, they particularly highlighted that 
whilst some firms may not be doing enough, others may be doing more than is required or 
necessary in the circumstances.152 
For the purpose of considering the customer’s income, under the affordability assessment, 
the FCA requires that it is not generally sufficient to rely solely on a statement of current 
income made by the customer without independent evidence, for example, in the form of 
information supplied by a CRA or documentation of a third party supplied by the third party 
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or by the customer.153 However, once again this is guidance as opposed to a regulation, the 
use of the phrase ‘is not generally sufficient’ emphasises the firms free reign to decide upon 
how they carry out their affordability assessment. Further, the use of this abstract term of 
phrase makes the regulation very confusing. On the one hand firms are being told to take 
into account the customers income, to ensure that the loan repayments do not have a 
significant adverse impact on the customers financial situation, whereas on the other hand 
they are being told that it is not generally sufficient to rely on a statement by the consumer. 
How are firms meant to interpret this? One would interpret this as whilst solely accepting a 
customer’s statement is frowned upon, there is scope to solely accept this without any 
negative repercussions. There is scope for lenders to do more to obtain proof and undertake 
a more thorough assessment of borrowers’ potential vulnerability.154 This is a clear 
indication that the FCA responsible lending rules need to be stronger to ensure that firms 
routinely carry out rigorous affordability checks.155 
When the Office of Fair Trading carried out an assessment, they reported that they had 
found that whilst 74% of lenders carry out an affordability assessment for all new 
customers, 67% said they did so for every new loan, and only a mere 23% did so for each 
loan rollover.156 These statistics are very interesting, it is apparent that only 26% of all of the 
lenders who took part in the questionnaire do not even carry out an affordability 
assessment for new customers.157Whilst analysing each section, and highlighting key words 
that create these grey areas, research has found that different lenders take very different 
                                                          
153 Consumer Credit Sourcebook CONC 5.2A.16(3) 
154 Citizens Advice (n 7) 14 
155 ibid 
156 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Payday Lending: Compliance Review Final Report’ (2013) 12 > 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/532ad55eed915d0e5d00038d/oft1481.pdf <accessed 30 July 
2019 
157 ibid 
37 
 
approaches when making these assessments. Whilst again this creates the flexibility for 
firms to allow consumers to access credit, serious concerns have been raised with regard to 
lenders gathering a sufficient amount of information to make a reliable affordability 
assessment, or to properly check the information they do receive.158 Initially one would 
have argued that the introduction of an affordability assessment was a step forward in 
ensuring consumers are fully protected. However, its effectiveness would allow one to 
argue otherwise. The initial idea has lost its practicality due to the gaps in the regulation 
which allow it to be subject to abuse, jeopardising consumer protection and subsequently 
not doing what it set out to do. 
When discussing the affordability assessment, a former credit lender that is particularly 
interesting to look at is Wonga, a lender who entered administration in 2018, the key issue 
in this firm’s collapse being affordability.159 Whilst Wonga received complaints regarding the 
affordability of their loans prior to the FCA introducing the affordability assessment in 2014, 
many complaints were also received after the FCA introduced this requirement.160 Evidence 
demonstrated that loans even up until 2017 loans were made without adequate 
affordability checks being made.161 Wonga’s payday loans have been referred to as ‘the 
crack cocaine of debt, unneeded, unwanted, unhelpful, destructive and addictive’.162 
However, whilst many have been glad to see Wonga gone, not all payday lenders are 
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inherently evil and whilst companies like Wonga have crumbled, providing alternative 
methods of lending have been alarmingly slow.163 The collapse of Wonga raised 
fundamental questions about the FCA’s regulations and guidance, particularly concerning 
the affordability assessment.164 Whilst the FCA has consistently stood its ground on fettering 
a credit lenders discretion to decide what is and what is not affordable, their reluctance to 
interfere and impose a clear judgement regarding affordability means that lenders will 
always seek what is in the firm’s best interest.165 It is easy to argue that for as long as the 
FCA continue to do this, the affordability assessment will always provide gaps in the so 
called safety net which vulnerable consumers are highly likely to fall through. Research 
found that whilst affordability and culture identified much improved compliance for many 
firms, the firms that were doing best were those that went above and beyond a compliance 
culture and purposefully fixated their culture on customer outcomes.166 However, Wonga is 
a clear example of a firm who failed to do this, and again one would question whether firms 
should have to purposefully fixate their culture on customer outcomes? Should regulation 
be put in place which already fixates customer outcomes for them? 
Poor affordability assessments have been recognised despite the introduction of an 
affordability assessment. One main issue that was recognised was the verification of 
whether credit lenders are carrying out sufficient affordability assessments, this is 
significantly difficult to do. Not do the rules provide too much scope for lenders to abuse 
them, the scope makes it difficult for the rules to be enforced. Further, the expense of 
carrying out such an assessment as well as the time it takes to do so is merely a burden on 
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the lender certainly not in their best interests as far as business is concerned.167 ‘It is all well 
and good having a range of new regulations and expectations of an industry that is famed 
across the western world for its relaxed attitude to sticking with guidance, this counts for 
nothing if enforcement of law shares this relaxed approach’.168 This overall summation given 
by independent researcher Carl Packman perfectly sums up the current regulations in the 
UK. The relaxed approach to the guidance provided by the FCA allows these financially 
vulnerable sector to slip through the safety net that this guidance should be providing, and 
if firms can get away with the bare minimum where consumer protection is concerned, the 
FCA’s regulations and guidance are seemingly worthless. 
Summary of responsible lending rules 
In summary, it is clear to see that both aspects of the responsible lending rules have issues 
with providing effective consumer protection. A report carried out by the National Audit 
Office found that regulation of the consumer credit market does provide benefits to 
consumers, however the regulatory regime is not fully effective as it does not fully minimise 
harm from unscrupulous trading practices. 169 If one were to summarise the effectiveness of 
the responsible lending rules, it is clear to see that whilst regulation has led to much better 
protection for consumers, there is far too much scope for the rules to be fully effective.  
A review by the FCA demonstrates that the introduction of the responsible lending rules has 
provided substantial benefits for consumers.170 The review found that 760,000 borrowers in 
the payday lending market are saving a total of £150m per year, credit firms unlikely to lend 
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to customers who cannot afford to repay the loan, and debt charities such as Stepchange, 
are seeing far fewer clients with debt problems linked to high-cost short-term credit.171 
Whilst the consumer protection has provided benefits, it is hard to ignore the discrepancies, 
alongside the uncertainty that come with the responsible lending rules, which have led 
cracks forming and vulnerable consumers being subjected to falling through these cracks. 
The dominant portrayal of payday lending led to the introduction of the responsible lending 
rules by the FCA, and tightened regulation on consumer credit lenders, following the 
changes, the number of loans and the amount borrowed from payday lenders dropped by 
35%.172 Despite this drop, many campaigners argued for further regulation to better 
strengthen consumer protection.173 With the current measures in place campaigners argued 
that people who are of a financially vulnerable nature would be better off without access to 
payday lending.174 In a press release, the chief executive of the FCA stated that high cost 
credit products remain a key focus for the FCA due to the risks that they pose for the 
vulnerable consumer.175 He also emphasised that the FCA were pleased with the marked 
improvement in the payday loan sector following on from a period where lenders treated 
the customers in an unacceptable manner.176 However, once again it must be emphasised 
how important access to credit is, and how tightening consumer protection is essentially 
going to ruin the payday lending market. If rules are too strict and do not provide a good 
degree of flexibility for firms, it is likely that credit lenders will turn away from the payday 
loan market and assert their business elsewhere, limiting access to credit.  Further if rules 
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are too strict, consumers will not be able to access credit, again jeopardising the payday 
loan market and restricting access to credit. 
When so many people are relying on payday loans, it is practicable to argue that consumer 
protection should be tightened, however balancing this with access to credit is rather 
difficult to do. If consumers cannot be fully protected and access to credit balanced 
alongside this consumer protection, which has been seen to be a recurring issue throughout 
this research, surely the FCA and the government should be looking at ways to provide 
alternatives to payday lending and prevent the financially vulnerable from being excluded 
from accessing credit, which is apparently essential in many households. 
Alternatives to Payday Lending 
Credit Unions 
As an alternative method of accessing credit, an interesting area to explore is that of Credit 
Unions. These are not for profit credit unions who offer financial services to almost one 
million people in the UK.177 It is important to explore the importance of credit unions, as it is 
arguable that their structure and use as international alternatives to accessing affordable 
credit, could be used as baseline structure for a government implemented scheme in the 
UK. Whilst vulnerable consumers may find it difficult to manage any unexpected expense, in 
everyday life it is very likely that this type of consumer may have to borrow money to meet 
these unexpected financial needs.178 Although financially vulnerable consumers may find 
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themselves excluded from mainstream credit, they may still meet the requirements of the 
creditworthiness assessments for credit union loans.179  
Credit unions conduct their business for members through a financial co-operative, with the 
key purpose of receiving from and to make loans to members. Although they do not serve 
the general public, membership can be gained through meeting the qualification criteria.180 
Under the rules of the society admission to membership must be restricted to persons who 
fall within one or more common bonds appropriate to a credit union,181 some examples of 
these common bonds are: following a particular occupation, being employed by a particular 
employer or residing or being employed in a particular locality, to name just a few.182 Whilst 
the main purpose of these unions is to provide loans, generally the law limits its loan terms 
to ensure that the loans granted are of maximum benefit to the consumer, however 
balances the protection of the credit unions interests.183 
An important point to consider is that the stark contrast between payday lending and credit 
unions is that the credit unions offer fair and reasonable fees, London Mutual Credit Union 
for example advance a loan of one hundred pounds for one month at just a cost of three 
pounds, therefore the borrower only has to pay one hundred and three pounds on the next 
payday.184 Whilst this type of loan seems to be a much better alternative to payday lending, 
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there are prominent issues with credit unions which result in consumers not taking out 
loans with them.  
Although this category of consumers may be eligible for this type of lending, there are still 
barriers which subject the financially vulnerable to exclusion. The greater availability and 
awareness of this affordable credit provision is an issue, there is a low awareness of credit 
unions and their purposes which mean these consumers will not access such credit due to 
them simply being unaware that this form of lending may be available to them.185 Further, 
credit unions are very different from commercial lenders as they do not have the same level 
of expenditure to invest in advertising to make people aware of their services.186 Also as 
discussed earlier, one of the common bonds is to reside in the area of the credit union the 
consumer wishes to take a loan from, however geographical or practical barriers arise when 
consumers try to access these lenders when they’re not available in their local area.187 A 
further issue is that whilst the interest charged by credit unions loans is capped at 3%, 
offering credit up to this interest per month may not allow credit unions to provide loans for 
higher risk consumers. Whilst the appeal of these low interest loans may be great for many 
consumers, higher risk consumers are still likely to be subjected to financial exclusion. 
However, increasing the 3% cap on interest is unlikely to solve this issue as credit unions are 
unlikely to want to lend credit to higher risk consumers.188 
It is clear to see that credit unions have their pros and cons, providing a loan which has a 
maximum benefit to the consumer whilst balancing the credit unions interests is a clear 
example of how the consumer is put first and not how much profit a firm can make from the 
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consumers repayments. One would state that credit unions provide a good base layer for a 
government implemented loan scheme, they provide loans to people who may not be 
eligible for mainstream credit, their interest rates are substantially lower than payday 
lenders and they provide affordable loans for those who may slip between the consumer 
protection regulations provided by the FCA for the payday loan market. Whilst the 
government would have a long way to go to implement or support such a scheme, and 
these criterions alone would not be sufficient to create such, one would argue that these 
basic ingredients used by credit unions to offer loans would be a great starting point for a 
government implemented scheme, focussed towards the financially vulnerable. 
The FCA have acknowledged the benefits credit unions can bring as an alternative to payday 
lending, however, have also acknowledged the issues currently standing with credit 
unions.189 A report has shown that the FCA want to see credit unions maximise their 
potential for growth with the help of the HM Treasury to consider in the longer term 
whether there is value in reviewing credit union legislating and facilitate the growth of 
larger credit unions.190 Further they would like to see credit union representatives working 
together to speak up with a more unified voice, making credit unions better known to 
consumers and aiding in their growth.191 If people were made aware of these alternatives, 
arguably consumer protection provided by the responsible lending rules would not have to 
be strengthened as there would be alternatives for the financially vulnerable to turn to. It is 
apparent that the FCA needs to do something more to protect the financially vulnerable, be 
it improve the level of consumer protection provided by the responsible lending rules or 
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simply to help aid the growth of credit unions, allowing the financially vulnerable to identify 
that there are other means of taking out a loan, where the loan is genuinely in the best 
interest of the consumer and not a hard headed credit lender who is focussing on making a 
profit.  
Budgeting Loans 
Another alternative, offered by the government, are budgeting loans. The government has 
identified the issues with payday lending and has to an extent taken action by providing an 
alternative to high cost short term credit, as demonstrated through the introduction of 
budgeting loans. Budgeting loans were introduced with the intention of defraying irregular 
expenses, allowing access to affordable credit for lump-sum expenses.192 Budgeting loans 
can be given for an array of expenses, including essential household items, rent in advance, 
repaying hire purchase loans or repaying loans for items such as furniture or household 
items.193 These loans are repaid in the form of an interest free loan which is paid back to the 
government from weekly benefit deductions194. Whilst the maximum loan that can be 
granted is £1000, and the minimum being £30, these loans were only introduced for people 
on income related benefits, providing them with an alternative and preventing them from 
being forced to rely upon unscrupulous and extortionate lenders.195 These loans are only 
available to people who have been on income support or income based jobseekers 
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allowance for at least twenty-six weeks.196 This means that people who are not eligible for 
benefits cannot be eligible for such a loan.  
Once again, immediate flaws cannot be highlighted when offering these loans. Whilst one 
would state that this is good idea and a step forward by the government, the responsible 
lending rules focus on a consumer’s income, various types of people can be subject to 
financial vulnerabilities, not strictly those who receive benefits. For example, self-employed 
people or those on zero-hour contracts, they would not be able to access these loans even 
when they really need them, as their income is not provided by the government through a 
benefits scheme. The criteria for budgeting loans is unfair, people who work and cannot 
claim benefits can be classified as a vulnerable consumer and may not be able to access 
credit, or where they can access the payday lending industry, may be subject to 
unscrupulous lending practices and debt traps.  
Further, and one would argue a rather pressing issue is that, whilst a creditworthiness 
assessment aims to prevent loans being taken out to pay other loans, this does quite the 
opposite. The government can provide a budgeting loan for the individual to pay off other 
loans, as it states it can be used for repayment of purchase hire loans or loans used to 
purchase a number of items such as furniture or household goods. One would say that 
surely it is not appropriate for the government to be advocating those who receive benefits 
to take out a loan to simply repay another. Those who are financially vulnerable due to a 
lack of financial education and managing finances, mentally ill or simply vulnerable due to a 
young age, could be granted these budgeting loans if they receive benefits, and think that it 
is okay for them to take out loans to repay other loans. One would argue that this is 
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something the government needs to reconsider, offering a no interest loan to pay off an 
interest loan is simply not tackling the issues consumer credit raises. 
The government has taken a step in the right direction with the introduction of budgeting 
loans, however those consumers who are subject to the protection of the responsible 
lending rules and can fall through the gaps in the protection they provide, are not eligible 
for such loans. This is a mere demonstration of the government being ignorant, more is 
needed to be done by the government to resolve these prominent issues. One would 
question why the government cannot introduce financially vulnerable criterions to 
incorporate the financially vulnerable into these budgeting loans. The government has 
already provided a structure, and whilst deciding upon criteria for those to satisfy the 
financially vulnerable may be rather difficult, one would say that it is far from impossible. 
It is interesting to once again discuss the paternalistic element here, and how far the 
government should go. One would say that it is apparent that access to credit allows an 
individual a level of responsibility and independence, and stricter protection would lead to 
self-exclusion, and fewer people being able to access credit. However, if access to credit 
cannot be evenly balanced with consumer protection without the financially vulnerable 
falling through the lenient protectionist measures, a scheme should be offered with strict 
criteria, with the government showing a level of paternalism to ensure the financially 
vulnerable can access credit in a safe and affordable manner. 
In a recent study, the FCA have identified that the market for alternatives to high-cost credit 
is failing to achieve the beneficial nature that it set out to achieve.197 One would argue that 
this statement is truly correct. There are alternatives out there, however they have been 
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underused, underfunded and more focus needs to be placed on these to allow the right 
balance between access to credit and consumer protection. However, this balance cannot 
be achieved through the responsible lending rules alone. If the payday loan industry wants 
to survive without being subjected to very strict regulations, alternative methods of credit 
are key to offering the financially vulnerable access to the credit that they ultimately need, 
without being subjected to big credit firms taking advantage of their vulnerabilities.   
Government implemented schemes 
Whilst it is easy to say that improving credit unions or developing budgeting loans would be 
a step forward in solving the issues caused by the lack of consumer protection under the 
responsible lending rules, it is apparent that the UK was not the only country to experience 
these issues. It is interesting to see how other countries have dealt with these issues and 
whether the methods they used to tackle such issues would be beneficial for the 
government in England and Wales to consider. The discrepancies highlighted with the 
current UK rules and regulations demonstrate that there is a need to look at new ways to 
provide greater access to more affordable credit, which provide safety nets for the most 
financially vulnerable. One way to tackle such issue would be to look at international 
examples of no and low interest consumer credit schemes. One suggestion is to explore how 
different countries tackle the same issue and determine whether a similar scheme would be 
advantageous to the financially vulnerable sector in the UK. Providing this sector with access 
to credit without exposing them to unscrupulous practices, and financial debt traps which 
have the potential to take over the consumers lives.198  
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Similarly to the UK, Australia was concerned that access to short term credit lacked 
regulations that were strong enough to protect consumers from over indebtedness caused 
by such loans.199 The ultimate issue found in Australia was that low income households 
were taking on a great amount of debt in order to sustain an acceptable way of life.200 The 
development of uniform regulations over payday lending has developed similar trends in an 
array of countries, particularly similar are Australia and the UK. Many factors led to the need 
for very targeted new rules and regulations in Australia, however the rise of the high cost 
short term credit market, as well as politicians and customer advocates paying very close 
attention to the rest of the world, particularly the UK, highlighted this need.201 Additional 
strategies were implemented alongside these reforms to reduce consumers reliance on 
payday loans, these strategies included the increased availability of affordable credit, as an 
alternative to payday loans.202  
It is interesting to find that the Australian government supports a No Interest Loan Scheme, 
which provides people who receive low incomes, fair loans which are a safe and affordable 
alternative to payday loans.203 Calls for regulation in Australia led to reforms which were 
followed by a highly charged and polarised debate, sparked by conflicting interests of 
consumer and welfare advocated who demanded an increased protection for consumers as 
well as the payday loan industry.204 This scheme provides individuals and families on low 
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incomes with access, safe and affordable credit.205 This scheme is run by community 
organisations in partnership with financial institutions.206 Good Shepard Microfinance works 
alongside the National Australia Bank, and offers a series of credit products, specifically the 
No Interest Loan Scheme.207 Loans are available to consumers for up to $1500 for essential 
goods such as essential household items, educational essentials and some medical 
services.208 The eligibility criteria provide that to apply for a loan the individual must be on a 
low income of no more than $45,000 per year or a no more than a joint income of $60,000 
per year209. Further the loans cannot be used for cash, rent arrears or debt consolidation. 
Once a loan is granted, repayments are set up for the individual, set at an affordable 
amount over twelve to eighteen months.210 
The criteria set for these loans to be available is very interesting and one would argue a 
great way to allow credit for those on low incomes or financially vulnerable. When 
comparing this scheme to the budgeting loans offered in the UK, it is apparent that they 
share many similarities. Both can be used to purchase essential household items, both 
provide interest free loans, however the stark contrast is that to be eligible for a budgeting 
loan the individual must be receiving a form of benefits from the government. However, the 
No Interest Loan Scheme in Australia provides loans for those earning an income, allowing 
those on a low income, who may struggle to afford necessary items at a given time, the 
opportunity to access credit which is not subject to high cost and high interest. Further 
Australia restricts their loans to certain items and specifies that they cannot be used to 
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repay other loans.  This is a much better improvement than that provided by budgeting 
loans. It allows finance to individuals for items that are essential at a particular point in time, 
it does not push forward a culture of taking out loans to repay other loans. By limiting what 
the loans can be used for allows consumers to take out loans for essential items, as opposed 
to luxury items they want, rather than the items they ultimately need. Further, unlike 
budgeting loans this level of paternalism is needed, instead of promoting interest free loans 
with the allowance for them to be used to repay existing loans, an interesting point that one 
suggests the government in the UK should take into consideration. 
An evaluation of the no interest loan scheme demonstrated that they have been successful 
in diverting consumers from fringe credit, with forty-two percent of no interest loan 
recipients ceasing to borrow from such lenders.211 Further, and more recently, the headlines 
have featured Australia’s plans to pour sixty-million pounds into the no interest loan scheme 
to divert vulnerable borrowers from high interest payday lenders.212 It is believed that the 
policy is a modest and sensible investment in helping people get loans to help them make 
ends meet when they need it, without having to turn to payday lenders.213 Evidence suggest 
this scheme has been successful and one would argue that it is a good way to allow loans to 
the financially vulnerable, with a level of paternalism, that prevents them from financial 
exclusion and the harm that can be associated with payday lending. 
Although alternative affordable credit is favoured, it must be noted that one type of 
affordable credit is unlikely to be enough for everyone. There is a need for an expansive 
                                                          
211 Fairweather, O’Shea, Grantham (n 25) 120 
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provision which allows affordable credit alternatives and emergency support for people who 
need access to credit immediately.214 Debt charity StepChange recommended that a 
sustained and long-term programme is necessary to expand community lending, further 
they have identified that the UK lead the development of a no interest loan provision as an 
alternative to payday lending, for the financially vulnerable.215 
Conclusion 
From this research, it is practicable to conclude that whilst the introduction of the 
responsible lending rules has been a step forward in ensuring consumers are protected 
when considering a payday loan, financially vulnerable consumers are falling through the 
safety net they provide. A big issue is the FCA’s attempt to balance consumer protection 
with access to credit. The current regulations in place delve away from consumer protection 
to allow for individuals to be able to access credit, and whilst the FCA has emphasised its 
flexible approach to the regulations and the guidance it provides, it is rather abstract to 
ensure credit lenders adopt their own assessments tailored to their products and services. 
However, the problem with allowing this level of flexibility subsequently subjects the 
financially vulnerable sector of society to loopholes and gaps in the legislation where harm 
is likely to be caused to them. Strictly keeping many elements as guidance and not enforcing 
this guidance as regulation, provides scope for firms to disregard the consumer protectionist 
elements, and further makes the regulations difficult to enforce.  
However, if these rules were more prescriptive and enforced in a more strict manner, 
consumer protection would override access to credit and take away the benefits that it 
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215 ibid 
53 
 
provides, such as financial inclusion, the ease of accessing credit and the level of dignity and 
independence the provision purports. Balancing access to credit and consumer protection 
for the financially vulnerable is seemingly impossible, as increasing one jeopardises the 
effectiveness of the other. 
An analysis of the responsible lending rules demonstrates that there are problems with 
them from a consumer protection perspective. The FCA’s use of terminology takes a very 
relaxed approach and again provides scope for credit lenders to abuse their power and 
grant loans to consumers even where the creditworthiness assessment is not fully fulfilled. 
Again, similar issues arise with regard to the affordability assessment. The lack of restrictive 
measures provides a level of scope to credit lenders to abuse their powers and take 
advantage of consumers vulnerabilities. This is clearly demonstrated through firms claiming 
to be unsure on how to interpret some of the terminology used by the FCA, and the FCA’s 
refusal to be more prescriptive simply results in lenders being confused and unsure, a 
position one would argue that a firm should not be in when deciding whether or not to 
grant a loan. Further issues are raised by CRA’s. Their lack of real time data sharing poses a 
problem for firms, as it leaves them with out of date information, potentially attributing to 
unaffordable debt and having quite the opposite effect to protecting consumers.  
The FCA provides a good consumer protectionist regulation with its affordability 
assessment, however, again provides scope for lenders to easily abuse such regulation. 
Further, the use of abstract terms is very confusing. The interpretation of terms and phrases 
are likely to differ from firm to firm, again providing that leeway and scope for credit lenders 
to abuse the consumer protection regulations. The case study of Wonga is the perfect 
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example of a credit lender wo abused the level and scope provided by the FCA and failed to 
carry out adequate affordability assessments.  
It is clear to see that providing alternatives to payday lending would avoid the difficulty of 
balancing access to credit with consumer protection and allow the financially vulnerable a 
better way of getting the credit they need, without being subjected to financial exclusion. 
Credit unions provide a good start as an alternative, advertising and emphasising their use 
would be a step forward in making people aware of the alternatives that are available. 
Further, they provide a good structure for the government to introduce something similar, 
specifically focussing on the financially vulnerable. Budgeting loans again are a good 
alternative for the people who meet its criteria, however one would recommend that the 
government revise the use of these loans and ensure better effectiveness of their use, for 
example not being used to repay loans taken out for luxurious items. They provide a good 
starting point once again, they offer a set-criteria, no interest and emphasise that the 
government has acknowledged the issue of people on low incomes being able to access 
affordable credit. However, the government needs to further acknowledge that low income 
is not the only source of financial vulnerability, and incorporating elements such as mental 
health, age and employment issues into such a scheme is likely to be a great way of offering 
alternatives to high-cost credit.  
It is interesting to see how the Australian government dealt with a similar pressing issue. 
Their no interest loan scheme has focussed on key issues and set a practical list of criteria 
for people who genuinely need these loans, to be able to access them. The scheme has been 
proven to be a successful alternative for Australia, and whilst one would say what works for 
one country may not work for another, it is worth the government in England and Wales 
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analysing this government supported scheme and develop ideas to tackle the issues that still 
remain in the UK today.  
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